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Stuart Pocock [1983] defined clinical trials as any planned experiments, involving 
patients with a given medical condition, which are designed to elucidate the most 
appropriate treatment for future cases. The canonical example of experiments of this 
sort is the drug trial, which is usually divided into four phases1. Phase I focuses on 
finding the appropriate dosage in a small group of healthy subjects (20-80); thus such 
trials examine the toxicity and other pharmacological properties of the drug. In phase II, 
between 100 and 200 patients are closely monitored to verify the treatment effects. If 
the results are positive, a third phase, involving a substantial number of patients, begins, 
in which the drug is compared to the standard treatment. If the new drug constitutes an 
improvement over the existing therapies and the pharmaceutical authorities approve its 
commercial use, phase IV trials are begun, wherein adverse effects are monitored and 
morbidity and mortality studies are undertaken. 
 
This paper focuses on phase III drug trials.  The standard experimental design for these 
trials currently involves a randomised allocation of treatments to patients. Hence the 
acronym RCTs, standing for randomised clinical (or sometimes controlled) trials2. The 
statistical methodology for planning and interpreting the results of RCTs is grounded in 
the principles established by Ronald Fisher, Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson in the 
1920s and 1930s. A hypothesis is made about the value of a given parameter (e.g., the 
survival rate) in a population of eligible patients taking part in the trial. The hypothesis 
is tested against an alternative hypothesis; this requires administering the drug and the 
control treatment to two groups of patients. Once the end point for the evaluation of the 
treatment is reached, the interpretation of the collected data determines whether or not 
we should accept our hypothesis about the effectiveness of the drug, assigning a certain 
probability to this judgment.   
                                                 
1 Clinical trials can be set to analyse many different types of treatment: not only drugs, but also medical 
devices, surgery, alternative medicine therapies, etc. The characteristics of these types of trials are quite 
different; so, for the sake of simplicity, I will only deal here with drug testing.  
2 In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, ‘RCTs’ will refer to standard frequentist trials. Notice though 
that randomization may well feature in the design of a Bayesian clinical trial.  
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This statistical methodology is based on a specific view of probability – called the 
frequestist approach -- according to which probabilities are (finite or infinite) relative 
frequencies of empirical events: here these are treatment effects in a given experimental 
setting. However, there are alternative interpretations of the axiomatic definition of 
probability and it is possible to construct clinical trials from at least one of these: 
Bayesianism. In the Bayesian approach, probabilities are conceived as degrees of belief. 
Hence, for instance, these probabilities can be calculated on the basis of whatever 
information is available and are not tied to a particular trial design [Berry, 2005]. Unlike 
in the case of standard RCTs, we can calculate these probabilities with or without 
randomisation and with any number of treated patients. Hence, depending on the 
conception of probability we adopt, clinical trials can be designed and their results 
interpreted in different manners, not always convergent.  
 
The first clinical trial planned and performed following a frequentist standard was the 
test of an anti-tuberculosis treatment, streptomycin. It was conducted in Britain and 
published in 1948. Over the following decades, RCTs would be adopted as a testing 
standard by the international medical community and by pharmaceutical regulatory 
agencies all over the world. Today, RCTs constitute the mainstream approach to drug 
testing and, through evidence-based medicine, they even ground standards of medical 
care. The 1980s brought a boom in Bayesian statistics, with many practical 
implementations in medicine, as well as in other disciplines. As soon as the computing 
power required by Bayesian calculations became available, increasingly sophisticated 
Bayesian trials were designed and implemented. It has been argued that these trials may 
be more efficient and more ethical than a frequentist RCT: e.g., reaching a cogent 
conclusion about the efficacy of a treatment may require fewer participants, minimising 
the number of patients exposed to the risks of the experiment. Today, there is debate 
about whether regulatory agencies, and in particular the FDA, should accept evidence 
from Bayesian trials as proof of the safety and efficacy of a drug. If (or, rather, when) 
this happens, frequentism may lose its commanding position in the field of medical 
experiments. The question is whether the grounds for this change are in fact sound. 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the philosophical debate on 
frequentist versus Bayesian clinical trials. This has been an ongoing discussion over the 
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last thirty years and it is certainly not closed. The comparison between these approaches 
has focused on two main dimensions: the epistemology of the statistical tools (e.g., p-
values vs. prior and posterior probabilities) and the ethics of the different features in 
each experimental design (e.g., randomisation). As of today, the mainstream view 
among philosophers (certainly not among biostatiscians) is that RCTs are epistemically 
and ethically problematic and a Bayesian alternative would be welcome. I would like to 
add a third dimension of comparison, so far neglected in this debate: the advantages of 
each approach as a regulatory yardstick. I contend that a fair comparison between these 
two approaches should simultaneously consider three dimensions: epistemological, 
ethical and regulatory. Philosophers and statisticians care deeply about the 
epistemological issues. Physicians and patients are equally concerned about the ethical 
issues. But we all care, as citizens, about the regulatory issues. There is a trade-off 
between these three different dimensions and the perfect trial that would satisfy all the 
concerned parties may well not exist. 
 
Most of the conflicts created by RCTs derive from the regulatory constraints imposed 
on medical experimentation. In a world where clinicians and patients were free to 
negotiate which testing standard was more mutually suitable for their goals in research 
and care, it is likely that the frequentist and Bayesian trials would both flourish. Yet for 
the last 100 years we have lived in a regulated world in which we want state agencies to 
conduct trials in order to determine whether treatments are safe and effective enough to 
warrant authorisation of their commercial distribution. RCTs were adopted as a testing 
standard by many of these regulatory agencies and, despite their epistemic and ethical 
flaws, they seem to have done a good job in keeping harmful compounds off 
pharmaceutical markets. As long as we want this type of regulatory supervision, we 
should be willing to accept certain constraints on our testing methodologies (be these 
frequentist or Bayesian) whenever we conduct experiments in order to gain regulatory 
approval.  
 
I will open the first part of this paper by trying to elucidate the frequentist foundations 
of RCTs. I will then present a number of methodological objections against the viability 
of these inferential principles in the conduct of actual clinical trials. In the following 
section, I will explore the main ethical issues in frequentist trials, namely those related 
to randomisation and the use of stopping rules. In the final section of the first part, I will 
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analyse why RCTs were accepted for regulatory purposes. I contend that their main 
virtue, from a regulatory viewpoint, is their impartiality, which is grounded in 
randomisation and fixed rules for the interpretation of the experiment. 
 
Thus the question will be whether Bayesian trials can match or exceed the achievements 
of frequentist RCTs in all these respects. In the second part of the paper, I will first 
present a quick glimpse of the introduction of Bayesianism in the field of medical 
experiments, followed by a summary presentation of the basic tenets of a Bayesian trial. 
The point here is to show that there is no such thing as “a” Bayesian trial. Bayesianism 
can ground many different approaches to medical experiments and we should assess 
their respective virtues separately. Thus I present two actual trials, planned with 
different goals in mind, and assess their respective epistemic, ethical and regulatory 
merits. In a tentative conclusion, I contend that, given the constraints imposed by our 
current regulatory framework, impartiality should preside over the design of clinical 
trials, even at the expense of many of their inferential and ethical virtues.  
 
1.1  I WHAT SESE ARE RCTS GROUDED I FREQUETISM?  
 
Running a phase III clinical trial is a manifold task, which goes far beyond its statistical 
underpinnings. The credibility (and feasibility) of a trial is conditional on a complete 
preplanning of every aspect of the experiment. This plan is formally stated in the study 
protocol. The following items should feature in the protocol, according again to Pocock 
[1983, p. 30]: 
 
Background and general aims Patient consent 
Specific objectives Required size of study 
Patient selection criteria Monitoring of trial progress 
Treatment schedules Forms and data handling 
Methods of patient evaluation Protocol deviations 
Trial design Plans for statistical analysis 
Registration and randomisation of patients Administrative responsibilities 
 
The aim of a trial is to test a hypothesis about the comparative efficacy of an 
experimental treatment (be it with the standard alternative or a placebo). Leaving aside 
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for a moment the statistical design of the test, first it is necessary to define which 
patients are eligible for the study (e.g., they should be representative of the disease 
under investigation); how to create an experimental group and a control group; how to 
administer treatment to each of them; and what the end-points for the evaluation of their 
responses are. During the course of the trial, an interim analysis is usually performed in 
order to monitor the accumulating results, since reaching the number of patients 
specified in the design may take months or years and because the information gleaned 
from such an interim analysis may in fact warrant some action such as terminating the 
trial early. Once the trial is completed, the hypothesis about the comparative efficacy of 
the treatment will be either accepted or rejected and the results published. Depending on 
the disease and the planned sample size, this may add several years to the time taken up 
by the two previous trial phases. Thus the development of a new drug may well take a 
decade before it is approved for public use by the pharmaceutical regulatory agency3.  
 
In this section, we will focus only on those aspects of the trial more directly connected 
to the frequentist view that have been more broadly discussed in the medical literature: 
namely, randomisation as a treatment allocation mechanism, on the one hand, and the 
use of significance testing and confidence intervals in the analysis of the results of the 
trial, on the other. The goal of this section will be limited to showing how these 
concepts are related to the frequentist interpretation of probability. It is important to 
clarify them in order to show the real scope of the Bayesian alternative: paradoxically, 
p-values and confidence intervals are often understood as if they measured some kind of 
posterior probability -- i.e., as if they were measuring Bayesian degrees of belief for 
certain events rather than frequencies. 
 
Let us start with randomisation. Once a patient is deemed eligible (according to the 
trial’s protocol) and recruited, the informed consent form signed and the log sheet with 
her identification details filled out, the treatment is assigned at random. Depending on 
the arrangement of the trial (number of treatments, whether or not it is double blinded, 
whether or not it is multi-centre), randomisation may be implemented in different ways. 
The general principle is that each patient should have an equal probability of receiving 
                                                 
3 For an updated account of the practical arrangements involved in a trial, including compliance with the 
current regulatory constraints, see [Hackshaw, 2009, pp. 157-201]. The book provides a concise overview 
of every dimension of a clinical trial today. For a thorough overview, see [Piantadosi, 2005]. 
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each treatment. If it is convenient to control the allocation of treatments according to 
patient characteristics, in order to prevent imbalances, randomisation can be stratified. 
What is the statistical rationale of this procedure? 
 
Let us informally sketch Fisher’s original argument for randomisation (as reconstructed 
in [Basu, 1980]). In order to study the response differences between the two treatments 
in trial patients, we need a test statistic with a known distribution: for instance, T=Σdi, 
where di is the response difference. Assuming the hypothesis that there is no difference 
between treatments, suppose we observe a positive difference di between treatments in a 
given pair of patients who received them at random. Assuming that our hypothesis is 
true, this difference must have been caused by a nuisance factor. If we kept this factor 
(and all other factors) constant and repeated the experiment, the absolute value of |di| 
would be the same with the same sign, if the treatments were identically allocated; it 
will be reversed if the allocation had been different. The sample space of T will be the 
set of 2n vectors R = {(± d1, ± d2,…., ± dn)}  
 
Randomisation warrants that all these vectors will have an equal probability. If di is 
positive for all i, we will observe another n response differences d’i equal or bigger than 
di if and only if d’i = di. The probability of observing this response is (½)
n, the 
significance level of the observed differences, as we will see below. This probability 
was, for Fisher, the frequency of observing this difference in an infinite series of 
repetitions of the experiment. And we will need it in order to calculate how exceptional 
the results of our experiment have been. 
This statistical rationale for randomisation is usually skipped in medical textbooks, 
where random allocations are usually justified through the following two arguments. 
First, randomisation prevents selection bias: it prevents investigators from assigning 
(consciously or unconsciously) patients with, say, a given prognosis to any one of the 
treatments. For instance, an investigator might allocate the experimental treatment to the 
healthier patients, if she wants the trial to be positive, or to the patients with a worse 
prognosis, if she thinks they will benefit more. This is an argument that never fails to 
appear in medical textbooks and, as we will see below, it was extremely influential in 
the acceptance of clinical trials by the medical profession, at least in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. A second argument that is often cited in medical 
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textbooks to justify randomisation can be traced back to Fisher’s famous tea tasting 
experiment. In clinical trials, randomisation would allow control over unknown 
prognostic factors, since, over time, their effect would be distributed in balance between 
the two groups. Bayesians and frequentists usually accept the first argument –we will 
see more about this in the second part of this paper. But, as we will see in the following 
section, there is more disagreement about the second argument within both approaches. 
However, neither of these two arguments presuppose a particular conception of 
probability, so we will not develop them at more length here.  
 
Let us focus instead on the statistical interpretation of test results. The aim is to evaluate 
how significant they are under a number of probabilistic assumptions. Again, it is often 
the case that their statistical rationale is only partially explained in medical textbooks, 
giving rise to great confusion about what clinical trials actually mean. So let us revisit 
once more the original rationales for significance levels, because, as we will see, the 
medical community (as it is often the case in many social sciences) uses a combination 
of them. 
The use of significance tests certainly predates Fisher. Leaving aside previous uses in 
astronomy, Karl Pearson was already using them to measure the discrepancy between a 
theoretical distribution of probability and a curve of empirical frequencies, using χ2 as a 
test of the “goodness of fit” [Cowles & Davis, 1982]. If the probability of observing a 
given value of χ2 was below 0.1, Pearson considered the goodness of fit “a little 
improbable”. But this implied nothing about the truth or falsity of any hypothesis –
being a committed positivist, Pearson viewed curves just as summaries of observations. 
W. S. Gosset made a more precise estimate of significance levels, arguing they should 
be “three times the probable error in the normal curve”: the odds of such an observation 
were approximately 30 to 1, which was usually rounded to 0.5. In the 1920s Fisher 
restated the concept within his own statistical framework. He was a frequentist for 
whom any probability judgment should be theoretically verifiable to any chosen degree 
of approximation by sampling its reference set. However, Fisher admitted various ways 
to represent our uncertainty depending on the extent of our prior knowledge4.  
Significance tests will better assess the plausibility of a given hypothesis (the null 
hypothesis) about which not much is previously known. It should allow us to specify a 
                                                 
4 Fisher’s positions is certainly simplified here. For a brief comparative discussion see [Lehmann, 1993].  
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unique distribution function for the statistic that we will use to test it.  But there may be 
many different such statistics available.  With this function, we can calculate the 
probability of each possible value of the statistic on the assumption that the hypothesis 
is true. Once the experiment is run and actual data provide the observed value of the 
statistic, we can also calculate how likely it is, assuming the truth of the hypothesis, to 
obtain a result with less or equal probability than the observed one: this is the p-value. 
In other words, the p-value is the proportion of an infinite series of repetitions of an 
experiment, all conducted assuming the truth of the null hypothesis, that would yield 
data contradicting it as strongly as or more so than the observed result. Therefore, the p-
value is a probability of observed and unobserved results which is tied to the design of 
the experiment and cannot be properly interpreted without it. 
Suppose the probability of observing a result within this tail area is less than 0.5: if one 
such result occurs in the experiment, Fisher would interpret it as a serious deviation 
from what we would have expected, were the hypothesis true. Such a result would make 
the hypothesis “implausible”: either an exceptionally rare chance has occurred or the 
hypothesis is not true. But the data alone cannot establish whether the former or the 
latter is the case (or whether both are).  
Fisher was careful (usually, but not always) to remark that a single experiment did not 
provide solid enough grounds to demonstrate any natural phenomenon. Only when an 
experiment is repeated and delivers results that systematically deviate from the 
hypotheses tested can we judge the latter to be implausible. However, the truth of the 
hypothesis can never be established with significance testing: it is just assumed. 
Neyman and Pearson developed a different rationale for the testing of hypotheses: 
instead of assessing the plausibility of a single (null) hypothesis, we should have a 
criterion for choosing between alternative exclusive hypotheses, with a known 
probability of making the wrong choice in the long run. Errors could be of two kinds: 
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true or accepting it when it is false.  
Using the probability distribution of the statistic, we define a rejection region R: if the 
observed value of the statistic falls within R, the null hypothesis (H0) should be rejected 
and the alternative hypothesis (H1) accepted; if the observed value falls outside R, H0 
should be accepted and H1 rejected. The probability α of making an error of the first 
kind (accepting H1 when it is false) is called the size of the test; given the probability β 
of making an error of the second kind (rejecting H1 when it is true), the power of the test 
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amounts to 1-β. In order to construct the test, we should decide which hypothesis would 
be the null, in order to minimize the probability α of an erroneous rejection. We then 
choose a rejection region with the desired probability α that maximises the power of the 
test. Achieving this power implies a certain sample size (a given number of patients in a 
trial). 
In the Neyman-Pearson approach, instead of measuring how implausible the observed 
result makes H0 (without any actual probability value), α gives us the probability of 
incorrectly rejecting H0 in a hypothetical long run of repeated experiments. Again, 
nothing is concluded about the truth of H0: accepting a hypothesis implies, at most, 
acting as if it were true. Whereas Fisher wanted significance to ground an inductive 
inference (repeated experiments would make H0 implausible), Neyman calculated 
probabilities (size and power) for a test, trying to minimize their epistemic import. For 
Neyman, we cannot know that H0 will be incorrectly rejected in only a given number of 
instances: we can only decide to believe it5. 
In its more widespread interpretation, the Fisherian p-value would somehow express the 
inductive support that a hypothesis receives from certain experimental data: given a 
certain observation, and assuming the hypothesis is true, it is the probability of 
observing it or a more extreme result6. The Neymanite significance level α is a 
deductively established probability of making type I errors in a series of experiments, 
before observing any particular result. 
Fisher was extremely unhappy with the approach advanced by Neyman and Pearson. 
Leaving aside technical objections, Fisher considered Neyman’s behaviouristic tests as 
an industrial procedure aimed at cutting experimental costs, not at solving inferential 
problems. However, as Gigerenzer et al. [1989] put it, their respective views were 
merged in a sort of “hybrid theory” that textbooks popularised over the second half of 
the 20th century. Neyman’s behaviourism was dropped and error probabilities were 
given an epistemic interpretation: the p-value became an observed α, a post trial error 
rate that measured the inductive evidence for a hypothesis. This is what Steve Goodman 
[1999a] calls the p-value fallacy. In a similar vein, a confidence interval is often simply 
                                                 
5
 In Neyman’s [1957, p. 12] own words, this is “an act of will to behave in the future (perhaps until new 
experiments are performed) in a particular manner, conforming with the outcome of the experiment”. 
From a Bayesian perspective, this inductive behaviour is just decisión-making without loss functions. 
6 As Donald Gillies made me notice, after 1930 Fisher himself would have preferred the fiducial 
argument by way of inductive measure: see [Gillies, 1973; Seidenfeld, 1979]  for an analysis. 
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understood as a range within which the true outcome measure is likely to lie, without 
any mention of error probabilities in the long run. As we will see in the second part of 
this paper, such misinterpretations would correspond more to Bayesian posterior 
probabilities than to the original frequentist definition.  
It is an open question to what extent these sorts of misconceptions have actual 
consequences on the assessment of the safety and efficacy of drugs.  Perhaps a better 
understanding of the scope of p-values and confidence intervals would contribute to 
reducing the confusion generated by so many trials with apparently mutually 
contradictory results7. However, this confusion may well have other sources, such as, 
for instance, the publishing practices inspired by pharmaceutical companies [Sismondo 
2009]. For the time being, I hope the previous clarification is enough to clarify in what 
sense RCTs are conceptually grounded in the frequentist paradigm. In the following 
section we will examine a number of objections concerning the possibility of 
implementing RCTs according to this very demanding standard. 
 
1.2 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES  
 
The controversy over the foundations of statistics between frequentists and Bayesians is 
too long and deep to be summarised here. Equally beyond the scope of this paper is a 
discussion of the technical objections addressed by each party against their respective 
approaches to clinical trials8. I will focus instead on the philosophical debate on the 
flaws of frequentist RCTs, presenting a number of arguments that hold independently of 
any conception of probability9. These objections, listed below, have been developed 
over the last thirty years, mainly by Peter Urbach and John Worrall, without much 
response so far. The reader may now judge to what extent they are conclusive.  
 
Objection #1: which population?  
 
                                                 
7 Statistical mistakes of this sort were soon denounced in the medical literature: see, for instance, 
Mainland 1960. For an update, see, e.g., [Sterne and Smith, 2001]. 
8 The interested reader can catch a glimpse of this debate in the special issue on this topic of the journal 
Statistics in Medicine 12: 1373-1533, 1993.   
9 A connected but separate issue that I will not address here either is the scope of RCTs in causal 
inference, which has also received some philosophical attention: see, e.g., [Cartwright, 2007; Papineau, 
1994] and also Dan Steel’s paper in this volume. 
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In a clinical trial there is no real random sampling of patients, since the population 
random samples should be drawn from remains usually undefined: there is no reference 
population, just criteria of patient eligibility in the trial protocol. Generalizing from the 
individuals entered into the study to any broader group of people seems ungrounded 
[Urbach, 1993]. 
 
Objection #2: significant events may not be that rare 
 
A positive result in a significance test is interpreted as an index that H0 is false. Were it 
true, such result would be an “exceptionally rare chance”. It would be exceptional 
because a randomised allocation of treatments would ideally exclude any alternative 
explanation: uncontrolled factors would be evenly distributed between groups in a series 
of random allocations. However, it would not be “exceptionally rare” that the treatment 
was effective in the case where it had been allocated to the healthier patients alone, to 
those with best prognoses or to any group of patients that for whatever reason could 
differentially benefit from the treatment.  
 
Colin Howson, among others, has argued that randomisation as such does not guarantee 
that the occurrence of such unbalanced allocation in a particular trial is rare: it may be 
produced by uncontrolled factors. As Worrall [2007, pp. 1000-01] puts it, 
“randomisation does not free us from having to think about alternative explanations for 
particular trial outcomes and from assessing the plausibility of these in the light of 
‘background knowledge’”. This further assessment cannot be formally incorporated, as 
it should be, into the methodology of significance testing. Hence, we cannot ground our 
conclusions on this methodology alone. 
 
Objection #3: post randomisation selection 
By sheer chance, a random allocation may yield an unbalanced distribution of the two 
treatments, i.e., the test groups may differ substantially in their relevant prognostic 
factors (these are called baseline imbalances). This difference may bias the comparison 
between treatments and spoil the experiment. If one such distribution is observed, the 
customary solution is to randomise again seeking a more balanced allocation. However, 
argues Urbach [1985], the methodology of significance testing forbids any choice 
between random allocations: if they are adequately generated, any allocation should be 
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as good as any other. Hypotheses should be accepted or rejected on the basis of the 
experiment alone, without incorporating our personal assessment of the generated data 
(justified though it may be). 
 
It is usually assumed that with a high number of enrolled patients, it is very unlikely that 
randomisation generates unbalanced groups. Urbach argues that we cannot quantify this 
probability and much less discard it. At best, a clinical trial provides an estimation of 
the efficacy of a treatment, but there is no direct connection between this result and the 
balance of the two groups. The conclusions of the trial can be spoiled by the following 
two objections. 
 
Objection #4: unknown nuisance variables after randomisation 
 
Even after randomising, uncontrolled factors may differentially influence the 
performance of a treatment in one of the groups. Further randomisations at each step in 
the administration of the treatment (e.g., which nurse should administer it today?) may 
avoid such interferences, but this is quite an impractical solution. Declaring such 
disturbances negligible, as many experimenters do, lacks any internal justification in the 
statistical methodology assumed [Urbach, 1985; Worrall, 2007].   
 
Objection #5:  known nuisance variables 
 
It has been argued that randomisation can at least solve the problem created by known 
perturbing factors that are difficult to control for. These could be at least randomised 
out. Following Levi [1982], Urbach [1985, p. 267] argues that since we know of no 
phenomena correlated to these confounding factors, “there is no reason to think that 
they would balance out more effectively between groups by using a physical 
randomising device rather than employing any other method”. 
 
Objection #6:  RCTs do not necessarily perform better than observational studies 
 
Despite all these objections, it is often claimed that RCTs are more reliable than non-
randomised “observational” studies such as, for instance, case-control studies, where 
retrospective samples of cases and controls matched for known risk factors are 
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compared. Cohort studies or registry databases may also provide information about 
comparative interventions. In the 1970s and 1980s analyses of randomised and non-
randomised trials of a given treatment showed that the estimated effects were higher in 
the latter than in the former10. If we assume that RCTs provide the more reliable 
estimation of the true effect of a treatment, we can conclude that the observational 
studies indeed “exaggerated” the effects.  However, a recent wave of analyses 
concerning the quantitative bias of observational studies shows that there might not be 
such overestimation. In view of all these, Worrall [2007, p. 1013] concludes that there is 
“no solid independent reason for thinking that randomisation has automatic extra 
epistemic weight”: if we do not commit ex ante to RCTs as the gold standard to provide 
the estimation of the effects of a treatment, the comparison is not necessarily 
unfavourable to observational studies.  
 
These six objections are sound, in my view. Even if, over the last 50 years, RCTs have 
certainly succeeded in identifying effective and ineffective treatments, their a priori 
epistemic grounds are not as flawless as you might think if you just relied on the 
standard biomedical literature. There is certainly room for competing alternatives, as we 
will have the occasion to discuss in the second part of this paper. However, let me close 
this section now noting that there is quite a general agreement, even among Bayesian 
critics, about one argument for randomisation: it offers protection against selection 
biases. As I already mentioned, the medical profession has always appreciated this 
epistemic virtue of randomisation, perhaps because there has been a clear awareness of 
biases of this sort in the medical literature for at least a hundred years if not more. 
Allocating treatments at random prevents any manipulation and guarantees a fair 
comparison. This argument for randomisation is also independent of any particular view 
of probability11 and, as we will see below, played a central role in the acceptance of 
RCTs as regulatory standards, as I will discuss in section 1.5 below. But let us now 
examine a different source of objections against frequentism in clinical trials: the ethical 
dilemmas it leads to. 
 
1.3 ETHICAL ISSUES  
                                                 
10  See [Worrall, 2007, pp. 1009-1013] for a discussion. 
11 See [Berry and Kadane, 1997] for a nice decision-theoretic argument for randomisation developed from 
a Bayesian perspective. See also how the impossibility of manipulation provides a very good defence for 
observational studies in [Vandenbroucke, 2004]. 
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Randomised clinical trials are, obviously, experiments with human subjects. As such, 
they are usually conducted under external supervision according to the ethical principles 
approved in the Nuremberg code, the Helsinki declaration, and other national and 
international guidelines12. Trials are conducted for research purposes, and the design of 
the experiment often imposes constraints on the standards of care that patients may 
receive. Many ethical dilemmas arise therein. In this section I will only focus on the 
conflicts more directly related to the frequentist foundations of RCTs: namely, the 
ethical issues involved in randomisation (as a treatment allocation procedure) and in the 
stopping rules that may close a trial before it reaches the targeted sample size13. 
 
 There is a common stance regarding the ethics of randomisation: it is only acceptable 
when there is genuine uncertainty in the medical community about which one among 
the allocated treatment is most beneficial for a patient (in the population determined by 
the study’s eligibility criteria)14. This is often referred to as clinical equipoise. Ideally, 
this would be reflected in the null hypothesis adopted (no difference between 
treatments) and the trial should eliminate this uncertainty. It is open to discussion 
whether there is a sound ethical justification for random assignment rather than patient 
or doctor choice whenever clinical equipoise obtains, or whether this is just an ad hoc 
ethical principle to justify the random allocation of treatments required by significance 
testing.  There has long been evidence that individual clinicians have preferences about 
the best treatment for their patients, in particular when the illness is serious and the risks 
and possible benefits are not negligible15. This could be interpreted as resistance to treat 
them as the indeterminate members of a statistical population, as required in the 
statistical design of the experiment. 
 
But even if there were genuine equipoise, why would it be ethical to allocate treatments 
at random? The standard argument for justifying the participation of patients in clinical 
trials draws on the general normative principles usually applied in bioethics after the 
                                                 
12 However, in developing countries the regulation of clinical trials is significantly softer and this creates 
a clear incentive for the industry to conduct their tests there: for an overview and discussion see [Macklin, 
2004].  
13 For a general overview of bioethics with particular attention to clinical trials, see [Beauchamp and 
Childress, 2001] and [Levine, 1998]. 
14 For a critique, see, for instance, [Gifford, 1986 and 1995].  
15 E.g., [Taylor et al., 1984]. 
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Belmont Report: autonomy, beneficence or non-maleficence, and justice. Autonomy is 
granted if the patients consent to receive their treatment at random after being properly 
informed about the clinical equipoise of both treatments and the research design of the 
trial. If the equipoise is genuine, then random allocation is consistent with the expected 
effect being as good as possible. As for justice, if there finally were a difference 
between treatments despite the initial equipoise, those who received the less effective 
one did so at random, which doesn’t seem intuitively unfair. The principles of autonomy 
and justice bear a more direct connection to the statistical assumptions of the trial, so let 
us discuss them in more detail. 
 
For all practical purposes, the autonomy of every patient in a trial is grounded in the 
informed consent she gives to participate in the experiment, signing a formal agreement 
before it starts. This is a legal requirement in many countries and, in addition, an 
Institutional Review Board usually oversees the process. There are different standards 
concerning the information that the patient should receive before giving consent, but it 
should certainly include the fact that the trial is for research purposes, the fact that 
participation is voluntary, and an explanation of the procedures to be followed. In 
RCTs, there is at least a paragraph about the random allocation of treatments, stated in a 
non-technical language16. However, there is qualitative evidence that patients often 
misunderstand these paragraphs, making their informed consent to randomisation 
dubious. Moreover, there is also evidence that clarifying this confusion is often difficult, 
if not expensive17.  
Various surveys of the patients’ motivation to take part in trials (e.g., [Edwards et al., 
1998]) point out that a randomised allocation of treatments is at odds with their goals: 
they are expecting to benefit personally from the treatment and the more information 
there is about the different effects of each drug, the more reluctant they are to a random 
assignment. It is often cited in this context how AIDS activists subverted research 
protocols in the early 1980s trials: among other things, they exchanged treatments after 
randomisation in order to increase their probabilities of receiving the experimental drug 
                                                 
16 E.g., “You will be randomised into one of the study groups described below. Randomisation means that 
you are put into a group by chance. It is like flipping a coin. Which group you are put in is done by a 
computer. Neither you nor the researcher will choose what group you will be in. You will have an 
EQUAL/ONE IN THREE/ETC. chance of being placed in any group” (From the informed consent 
template developed by the American national Cancer Institute in 1998, included as an appendix in  
[Hartnett, 2000]) 
17 See, e.g., [Featherstone and Donovan, 1998; Flory and Emanuel, 2004]. 
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[Epstein, 1996]. They vindicated their autonomy to bear the risks of receiving untested 
treatments and succeeded in gaining access to the first antiretroviral drug, AZT, before 
any trial was completed. If patients perceive any difference in the treatments that they 
can benefit from, they may well prefer to dispense with randomisation. Such differences 
exist: equality among treatments may refer just to the single quantified outcome 
measured in the trial, but the quality of life that each treatment yields may significantly 
differ. 
The question of the benefits that a patient can expect from a trial is also relevant for the 
discussion of the justice of randomisation. Intuitively, patients can perceive 
randomisation as a fair lottery. However, lotteries are considered fair procedures when 
the good allocated is scarce. This was sometimes the case in clinical trials, but usually 
there are doses of the experimental treatment for every patient in the experiment, even if 
only half of them receive it. What should be distributed are the potential benefits and 
burdens of the test, which are a priori unknown. The fairness of such a distribution does 
not rely on the outcome (some may win and some may lose, none of them deserving it), 
but rather on the impartiality of the allocation. No patient can claim that the allocation 
was intended to favour one person over another.   
 
The best formulation for the view of justice intuitively captured in the idea of a fair 
lottery is probably a contractarian one [Stone, 2007]. If the participants in a trial 
acknowledge that, all of them being equally eligible, all of them have equally strong 
claims to receive the potential benefits and burdens of the trial and, on the other hand, 
no other consideration is taken into account, then it seems plausible that they would 
agree to use an equiprobable lottery in order to distribute whatever comes out of the 
treatments. However, if we adopt a different approach to justice, the fairness of 
randomisation can be questioned. In a utilitarian perspective, for instance, the allocation 
of treatments would be fair if it maximised the social utility of the participants in the 
trial (or, perhaps, society as a whole). There is no a priori reason to presume that a 
randomised allocation would achieve this. E.g., if equipoise fails concerning the 
comparison of these treatments, there may be differences in the expected utility that 
each treatment may yield to each participant. Hence certain non-random allocations may 
yield a superior average expected utility superior and be ethically preferable from a 
purely utilitarian perspective.   
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To sum up, from an ethical perspective, randomisation is quite controversial, and it 
seems clear that if it were possible to avoid it, this would bring ethical gains. Alternative 
approaches to randomisation may fare better in some respects, as we will see in more 
detail in the second part of the paper. Yet if we want to interpret the results of the trial 
through significance tests, some sort of randomisation is necessary.  
 
The second ethically contentious topic regarding frequentism in clinical trials is that 
concerning stopping rules18.  It may happen that before completing the trial, a larger 
than expected treatment effect, either beneficial or harmful to the patients, is observed 
in the experimental arm. Or, alternatively, it may appear that the experimental therapy is 
having no effect. Hence the trial might be terminated early due to the very bleak 
prospect of demonstrating any effect, at the risk of not reaching the statistical power 
initially envisaged in the protocol, which is tied to the sample size (i.e., the number of 
patients treated in the trial). In order to justify this decision, certain factors should be 
considered. Namely, the plausibility of the observed effect, the number of patients 
already recruited, the number of interim analyses performed, and the monitoring method 
applied. If the trial takes a long time to be completed, the protocol will specify a number 
of interim analyses (e.g., according to certain clinical endpoints). At each stage, there 
will be a stopping rule providing a criterion for whether or not to continue the trial. The 
patients’ interests are usually considered in the choice of the interim endpoints. As 
mentioned above, a common view about the ethics of trial interruption nowadays is that 
this should happen as soon as the evidence accumulated contradicts the initial 
assumption of clinical equipoise. However, if the effect of the experimental drug is, at 
that point, positive, should we stop the trial and use it on other patients without 
conducting an additional trial in full? 19  
 
Our views on this question will depend on the epistemic standard we adopt. We might 
choose the standard view in evidence-based medicine, namely that only accomplished 
RCTs with a given statistical power count as proper evidence of the safety and efficacy 
                                                 
18 See [Baum et al., 1994; Cannistra, 2004] for a general discussion. See also [Mueller et al., 2007; 
Goodman, 2007] for a discussion incorporating the Bayesian perspective. 
19 This is what Gifford [2000, p. 400] calls the RCT dilemma: if trials are stopped as soon as clinical 
equipoise vanishes, but before we reach their predefined statistical endpoints, there would be no point in 
designing the experiment in search of a certain level or significance or power. 
  18 
of a treatment. In this view, it is unethical to administer the experimental drug to a 
patient without completing a trial20. Cases in which patients have been injured after 
receiving an improperly tested drug are cited for this position: thalidomide provides a 
good example. Under the trade name Contergan, one million West Germans consumed 
thalidomide as a sedative in the early 1960s –and subsequently many more people 
around the world. Reports were soon published in medical journals showing an 
association between the drug and peripheral neuropathy and, later, between the drug 
serious birth defects when consumed by pregnant women. Only then did the 
manufacturer withdraw the drug from European markets, but eight thousand babies had 
been already born with severe deformities. At that point, there was no clear regulatory 
standard about the safety of a compound, neither in the United States nor in Europe. As 
we will see in the following section, the thalidomide scandal prompted the approval of 
more strict regulations, leading to the current prevalence of RCTs. However, there are 
cases in which lives were lost in additional trials for a treatment whose efficacy was 
seemingly clearly evident, but not statistically grounded in a proper RCT: e.g. the 
ECMO trials, as analysed by John Worrall [2008]. 
 
A recent systematic review shows that the number of trials that are being stopped early 
for apparent benefit is gradually increasing [Montori et al., 2005]. This decision is 
usually not well justified in the ensuing reports: the treatment effects are often too large 
to be plausible, given the number of events recorded. Again, this is open to various 
interpretations: trials may have been stopped out of genuine concern for the patients’ 
welfare, but less altruistic motivations could have also played a role (e.g., pressure from 
the funding body or the urgency of an impact publication). Yet, this review [Montori et 
al., 2005] depends on the evidentiary standard we adopt: if we only consider credible 
the evidence originating from properly powered RCTs, we should be sceptical about the 
results of early stopping trials. However, if we accept alternative sources of evidence, as 
Worrall suggests, we may accept some of the results from these trials as legitimate.   
 
Just as it happened with randomisation, the problem is whether there is any alternative 
standard for judging clinical evidence which is at least as epistemically strong as RCTs, 
                                                 
20 Therefore stopping rules should be calibrated depending on the trade-off between benefits for the 
participants in a trial and benefits for future patients in order to minimize the loss of information if the 
trial has to be interrupted. See [Buchanan and Muller, 2005] for a discussion. 
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but causes less ethical trouble. Part of the strength of the Bayesian approaches we will 
discuss in the second part of this paper is that, in principle, they can solve these 
problems. On the one hand, randomisation is not strictly necessary for inference (even if 
it can be defended on other grounds); hence perhaps following a Bayesian approach will 
allow us to avoid it. On the other hand, a trial may be stopped at any point without 
disturbing the statistical validity of the results: the conclusions will be as strong as the 
evidence gathered so far.  
 
But before we get to examine this alternative, we should first consider just what the 
original alternatives to RCTs were and why the latter succeeded so quickly. Relatedly, it 
is worth noticing here that the ethical dilemmas we have just discussed are not created 
by RCTs as such, but rather by our current regulatory framework, in which RCTs 
feature prominently as a testing standard. As I anticipated in the introduction, a fair 
comparison between RCTs and any alternative approach to clinical trials should take 
into account not only the inferential and ethical merits of each option, but also their 
respective soundness as a regulatory standard. 
 
To this end, I will now present in some detail the different approaches to drug testing 
implemented over the 20th century, considering also their regulatory impact. This will 
show that we demand from clinical trials not only certain inferential virtues and ethical 
foundations, but also certain warrants of impartiality that vary according to each social 
context.  
 
1.4 REGULATORY ISSUES 
 
From the 1950s on, RCTs have been adopted in many countries as a regulatory standard 
to decide whether a drug is suitable for commercial distribution: a properly conducted 
phase III trial would decide about its safety and efficacy. As I mentioned in the 
introduction, this regulatory dimension of RCTs is not usually considered in their 
philosophical discussion, despite the attention it receives from sociologists and 
historians. However, the epistemic merits of RCTs as a regulatory yardstick should be 
considered together with their methodological and ethical foundations, if only because 
these merits were certainly considered by the agencies that adopted them as their testing 
standard.  This adoption poses an interesting philosophical problem: assuming that the 
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civil officers at these agencies were statistical novices, what sort of arguments 
convinced them of the superiority of RCTs as opposed to other testing methods?  Were 
they justified in accepting these arguments, or did they blindly follow the advice of the 
statistical experts who recommended RCTs?  
 
The standard sociological account of statistical expertise provides the following picture 
of how, in modern democracies, it came to replace non-mathematical forms of expert 
advice.  [Porter, 1995] An increasing pressure for public accountability made politicians 
choose statistical advisors. Statistical figures were perceived as the outcome of 
impersonal rules and calculations that exclude bias and personal preferences. Hence 
weak professional groups adopted statistical methods in order to strengthen their 
credentials as experts. In this account, trust in numbers is somehow blind: if there is no 
external check, the mere appearance of impartiality makes quite a poor epistemic 
justification. This approach grounds nowadays the best historical accounts of the 
introduction of RCTs for regulatory purposes. 
 
In this section, I will provide an overview of the regulatory uses of RCTs, discussing the 
main alternatives considered for drug testing in different countries. In choosing between 
these alternatives it seems as if the regulatory bodies were driven by an epistemic 
concern: they wanted their testing standard to be impartial, i.e., the result of the test 
should be independent of the interests of any of the concerned parties (patients, 
clinicians, the pharmaceutical industry, and the regulator itself). Historians and 
sociologists claimed that the adoption of RCTs as an impartial testing standard was 
blind, because their frequentist foundations were never well understood either by the 
medical profession or by the regulators. This claim may be true, but I contend that they 
understood quite well in what sense randomisation and significance testing provided 
insurance against testing biases, independently of their statistical underpinnings. In this 
respect, their adoption was clearly justified. By way of conclusion, I will briefly 
consider what our regulatory dilemmas are today and to what extent this impartiality 
request is still valid today.  
 
Between 1900 and 1950 expert clinical judgment was the main criterion in the 
assessment of the properties of pharmaceutical compounds, both in Britain and the 
United States. An experienced clinician would administer the drug to a series of patients 
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he considered more apt to benefit from it. His conclusions would be presented as a case 
report, informing of the details of each patient’s reaction to the treatment. The 
alternatives were first laboratory experiments and then controlled clinical trials (from 
which RCTs would later emerge). Laboratory experiments would proceed either in vitro 
or in vivo (on animals and patients) and they were considered superior by clinicians 
with a scientific background. Yet their scope was usually restricted to safety 
considerations. It soon gave way to comparative trials, in which two treatments were 
alternated on the same patient or administered in two groups of patients (simultaneously 
or not). The arrangements to secure the comparability of the two treatments were the 
controls, and these adopted different forms: among the most prominent features were a 
clear statement of eligibility criteria to enter the trial, alternation and then randomisation 
in the allocation of treatments, uniformity in their administration and blinding 
(concealing the administered treatment from the patients and sometimes the doctors). 
These controls were not necessarily used all at once. Descriptive statistical reports from 
these trials conveyed their results with different degrees of sophistication. Significance 
testing features only occasionally in the medical literature before 195021.   
 
The regulatory authorities in Britain and the United States arranged official drug testing 
depending on the standards adopted by the research community within their respective 
medical professions. In both cases, and all throughout the 20th century, regulators were 
concerned about impartiality, here understood as independence from the financial 
interests of the pharmaceutical industry. Tests sponsored by manufacturers for 
advertising purposes were considered suspicious by consumers in both countries and 
this prompted, in different ways, the development of public pharmaceutical agencies to 
conduct or supervise the tests. However, most clinical researchers considered 
themselves impervious to biases from non-financial sources and impartial enough to 
conduct clinical tests without bias-proof mechanisms. Until the 1960s, regulatory 
decisions were fundamentally based on expert judgments of this sort. Expert judgment 
came only to be discredited in the United States because in the late 1950s a group of 
methodologically-minded pharmacologists imposed their views on the superiority of 
RCTs at the Food and Drug Administration22. However, as Iain Chalmers and Harry 
Marks have often argued, even for this enlightened minority the inferential power of 
                                                 
21 For excellent overviews see [Edwards, 2007; Marks, 1997; Toth, 1997].  
22 For an illustration of these points see [Marks, 2000, Carpenter and Moore, 2007]. 
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RCTs and its statistical foundations were not the primary reason to adopt them: 
randomisation and significance testing were understood as impersonal rules for 
allocating treatments and interpreting  trial results which warranted the impartiality of 
the assessment.   
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, RCTs became mandatory for regulatory decisions in 
different degrees. In the United States, before the 1960s, the Food and Drug 
Administration was only entitled to test the safety but not the efficacy of pharmaceutical 
compounds. In the late 1950s there were voices in the FDA demanding stricter testing 
standards linking safety and efficacy, under increasing public mistrust in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The thalidomide scandal gave them the opportunity to project 
their views on the 1962 Drug efficacy amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetics 
Act. It required from the applicant “adequate and well-controlled clinical studies” for 
proof of efficacy and safety (although the definition of a well-controlled investigation 
would not be clarified until 1969, when it was formally quantified as two well-
controlled clinical trials plus one previous or posterior confirmatory trial). Carpenter 
and Moore [2007] are correct, in my view, when they claim that this set of regulations 
created the modern clinical trial industry. In the following three decades, 
pharmaceutical funding would boost the conduct of RCTs in the United States and 
abroad. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the Medical Research Council (MRC) acted as a consulting 
body to the Ministry of Health in pharmaceutical issues from the 1920s on. Unlike the 
FDA, the MRC did not supervise ex officio the British drug market: when its 
Therapeutic Trials Committee started testing compounds in the 1930s, it was always at 
the request of the manufacturer. The MRC trials were undertaken in support of the 
British pharmaceutical industry, with a view to foster its international competitiveness 
and domestic reputation. Until the thalidomide scandal in the 1960s, the 
commercialisation of a drug in the UK did not formally require any sort of clinical test 
for either safety or efficacy. The thalidomide scandal prompted the creation of the 
Committee on Safety of Drugs (CSD) within the Ministry of Health, with a 
subcommittee in charge of clinical trials and therapeutic evidence. However, neither the 
Ministry of Health nor the CSD could legally prevent the commercialisation of new 
drugs. The industry informally agreed to get CSD approval for their trials and inform 
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them about the toxicity of their products: it was a non-compulsory licensing system 
established on the basis of safety alone, not efficacy. This voluntary arrangement 
operated smoothly for almost a decade (1964-1971). A statutory system came to replace 
it as a result of the 1968 Medicines Act, which gave to the Ministry of Health the 
licensing authority, with a Medicines Commission acting as advisory body. The 
industry was now required to present evidence regarding safety and efficacy, but 
clinical trials were defined in the 1968 Act in a way general enough to encompass all 
the testing procedures mentioned above (from expert clinical judgment to statistical 
tests). Even if RCTs were at this point the testing standard in clinical research in Britain, 
the regulator did not officially adopt them as a yardstick. Provided that the regulatory 
body established its independence from the industry (hence, its financial impartiality), it 
was possible to submit evidence gathered from different sources and the decision would 
be made on a case by case basis.23  
 
Impartiality in clinical trials is therefore the more socially desirable the bigger the 
public concern about biases, and this seems to depend entirely on the context in which 
trials take place. In Germany, for instance, the Drug Law was also revised in the 
aftermath of the thalidomide catastrophe. Yet this did not bring centralised control over 
clinical trials, which was considered costly and inefficient. Instead, it was agreed that 
the Federal Chamber of Physicians (BÄK) Drug Commission and the German Society 
for Internal Medicine issue guidelines for drug testing that the manufacturers should 
follow. Unlike Britain or the United States, in Germany therapeutic reformers did not 
form a coalition with statisticians after the II World War. Arthur Daemmrich’s [2004, 
pp. 53-54] hypothesis is that, as a reaction against the terrible experiments conducted by 
the Nazi doctors during the war, the German medical profession strongly defended the 
necessity to treat patients individually, beyond any research protocol reducing them to 
standardised cases. In consequence, placebos and double blind experiments were often 
avoided, even if their virtues against biases were known and praised. The BÄK’s 
reputation was based on the defence of patients' rights and not even the thalidomide 
scandal could shatter it throughout the 1960s and 1970s. While RCTs became more and 
more widely used, the 1976 Drug Law still granted the medical profession the right to 
                                                 
23 On the creation and early trials of the MRC see [Cox-Maksimov, 1997]. The regulatory dimensions are 
discussed in [Abraham, 1995; Ceccoli, 1998]. 
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set testing standards, even if the BÄK had been already accused of pro-industry bias and 
the socialist party had demanded a “neutral” examination of drugs by a central agency. 
 
The political demands and expectations placed on clinical trials were different in all 
these countries. However, for regulatory purposes, the testing standard adopted was 
always justified on the grounds of its purported impartiality, no matter if whether was 
clinical expert judgment, laboratory tests, or RCTs. Historians and sociologists are 
probably right in explaining this regulatory concern for impartiality as the result of 
external public pressure. However, it is open to discussion whether the adoption of a 
testing standard was always epistemically blind. It may be true that the statistical 
foundations of RCTs were never well understood by the medical profession as a 
regulatory yardstick either in the United States or in Britain at the time of their 
adoption, or even later. However, in both cases, the medical profession, and even the 
public, seemed to understand quite well in what sense RCTs offered real protection 
against biases in the conduct and interpretation of medical experiments. RCTs provided 
proper impartial grounds for regulatory decisions. As I pointed out in the previous 
sections, randomisation certainly helps in preventing selection bias independently of its 
statistical grounds. Significance testing was understood less as discretionary 
interpretation rule than mere clinical expert judgment. On these grounds, the adoption 
of RCTs as a testing standard for regulatory purposes seems epistemically justified24.   
 
All in all, the social process that led to the adoption of frequentist RCTs as a regulatory 
standard may have been interest-driven, but it was not epistemically blind. If we still 
adhere to the principle that regulatory clinical trials should be independent of the 
particular interests of the manufacturers, any alternative testing methodology should be 
at least as impartial as our current RCTs are. However, the situation is today far more 
complicated than in the 1950s. 
 
As we saw in the previous sections, as patients we may prefer to avoid randomisation, 
but as consumers of pharmaceutical compounds we may want them to be fairly tested 
by an independent authority. For the pharmaceutical consumer, the situation is today 
                                                 
24 Of course, RCTs are not the only means to implement a fair test, but just part of a larger set of tools: 
see [Evans et al., 2006] for an overview. The interested reader can visit the James Lind Library for a 
general view of the evolution of fair tests over the world: http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/  See also the 
Project Impact site: http://www.projectimpact.info/   [both accessed in July 2009] 
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paradoxical in this respect. On the one hand, tight regulatory standards generate lags: it 
takes more time for a new drug to reach its targeted consumers, with significant 
economic costs for the producer. On the other hand, consumers are, more than ever, 
wary of potential fraud in the testing process, if the industry is entirely free to conduct 
them25.  In the United States, for-profit private contractors conduct about 75 percent of 
all clinical trials, in which the pharmaceutical industry invests billions of dollars 
annually. There is growing evidence of bad testing and reporting practices biasing the 
results, such as: enrolling patients with a milder disease or healthier than the population 
who will actually receive the drug, using a dose of a comparable drug that is outside of 
the standard clinical range, using misleading measurement scales, etc26. In this context, 
randomisation and significance testing alone do not guarantee an unbiased clinical trial: 
various surveys have found significant degrees of association between private 
sponsorship and positive conclusions for the experimental drug in published trials27. Of 
course, these results are open to interpretation (it may simply be the case that the 
industry only funds and publishes trials of products that are considered better than the 
standard therapy), but caution about bias is advisable.  
 
In sum, frequentist clinical trials are controversial from a methodological and ethical 
perspective, but have worked reasonably well so far as an impartial regulatory standard. 
However, there is a clear need for improvement on this front as well: we want 
regulatory trials to be both more impartial and more efficient (and, in particular, 
quicker). The prima facie strength of the Bayesian approach to clinical trials is that they 
promise improvement along these three dimensions (methodological, ethical and 
regulatory). Let us present how they work. 
 
2.1. BAYESIA TRIALS: A 25 YEARS HISTORY 
Let me begin this second part of the paper with a brief summary of the development of 
the Bayesian approach to clinical trials during the last thirty years. I follow here 
Deborah Ashby’s [2006] review, where she distinguishes three main periods. In the first 
one, ranging from 1982 to 1986, several experimental designs were launched and some 
                                                 
25 For an overview of the literature on the drug lag and related topics, see [Comanor, 1986]. [Carpenter, 
2004] provides an analysis of patients' influence on FDA decisions. The risks of pharmaceutical fraud are 
discussed in [Krimsky, 2003] 
26 For a quick general overview of these practices see [Jain, 2007]. 
27 E.g., [Lexchin, et al., 2003; Yank et al., 2007]. 
  26 
were even implemented [Kadane, 1996]. But the computational power needed to 
implement more ambitious  trials was still lacking. This became gradually available 
between 1987 and 1991, when the BUGS computer simulation package was created. 
Then came a period of consolidation (1992-1996), with a regular flow of publications 
on Bayesian trials and the first hints of regulatory attention to this approach. In the 
following ten years the variety of ideas and experiences accumulated deserved a first 
textbook [Spiegelhalter, Abrams & Miles, 2004]. Over the last ten years many phase I 
and II trials have been conducted following Bayesian principles, since these are allowed 
by the regulations. Phase III trials for drugs are still rare, due to regulatory restrictions, 
but they are already accepted by the FDA for medical devices28. And a Bayesian meta-
analysis has been accepted as evidence in 2003 in the approval of a therapeutic 
compound29. Bayesianism has not yet reached the mainstream medical literature: 
according to Ashby, it will be the next frontier. But there is growing debate on whether 
the FDA should approve Bayesian designs for regulatory purposes, and if this occurs, 
this last boundary will soon be crossed, just as it happened with standard RCTs.   
I will first introduce the more elementary concepts in the Bayesian approach to clinical 
trials, together with an attempt to classify the different methodologies in their design 
and analysis. The point of this section is to show that Bayesian clinical trials are 
constitutively diverse and can be tailored to multiple purposes, so no straightforward 
overall comparison with standard RCTs is possible. In order to illustrate this diversity, 
in the following two sections I will briefly review two different Bayesian trials. The first 
one, conducted during the 1980s, exemplifies how very elaborate ethical considerations 
can be incorporated into the design of a trial through a statistical representation of 
expert judgment. The second one, designed and conducted at the beginning of this 
decade, illustrates instead the potential efficiency of Bayesian trials and their impact on 
the regulatory process. 
The following three sections will thus cover the basic items considered in the first part 
of the paper: epistemic, ethical, and regulatory issues. On these grounds I will provide a 
final discussion of the relative merits of each approach, frequentist and Bayesian, in the 
concluding section.  
 
                                                 
28 I will not consider here the case of medical devices: see [Campbell, 2005] for a discussion. 
29 See [Berry, 2006, p. 29] for a quick review. The published source is [Hennekens et al., 2004]. 
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2.2 BAYESIA APPROACHES: A QUICK ITRODUCTIO 
The basic paradigm of Bayesian statistics is straightforward. Initial beliefs 
concerning a parameter of interest, which could be based on objective evidence 
or subjective judgment or a combination, are expressed as a prior distribution. 
Evidence from further data is summarized by a likelihood function for the 
parameter, and the normalized product of the prior and the likelihood form the 
posterior distribution on the basis of which conclusions should be drawn 
[Spiegelhalter, Freedman and Parmar, 1994, p. 360]30. 
Suppose we are interested in finding out the true mean difference (δ) between the 
effects of two treatments. The statistic xm would capture the difference observed in the 
sample of participants in a comparative trial. The statistic xm would here be normally 
distributed as expressed in the following density function: 
),()( 2 mxxp mm σδφ=    
where m would be the number of observations of the mean response recorded so far in 
the trial and δ and σ2/m would stand for the mean and variance of the distribution. This 
first equation provides the likelihood function: it shows the support lent by the trial data 
to the possible values of the mean difference between treatments. 
Our initial beliefs about the true mean difference (δ), excluding all evidence from the 
trial, could be expressed thus by this density function: 
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Bayes theorem would allow us to weight our prior by the likelihood function31, 
obtaining the posterior distribution of δ: 

















                                                 
30 In this section, I will follow two standard introductions: [Spiegelhalter, Freedman and Parmar, 1994] 
and [Spiegelhalter, Abrams and Miles, 2004]. Donald Berry has produced very concise overviews of the 
Bayesian approach to clinical trials: e.g., [Berry, 1993 and 2006].  
31 In the usual expression of Bayes theorem, the product of the prior and the likelihood function is divided 
by the normalising factor p(xm). 
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This is the expression of our beliefs about δ after m observations. The posterior mean 
would provide a point estimate of the true mean difference (δ) between treatments. The 
posterior mean ± 1.96 posterior standard deviations would provide a 95% credible 
interval estimate of δ.  
By way of example, Spiegelhalter, Freedman and Parmar [1994] provide the following 
Bayesian analysis of a conventional RCT. This trial studied the effects of levamisole 
(LEV) in combination with 5-fluorouracil (5-FU) for patients with resected cancer of 
the colon or rectum: that is, LEV+5-FU versus control. The main outcome measure in 
this trial was the duration of patients’ survival.  
Two prior distributions were constructed for the analysis. The first one was a sceptical 
prior formalizing the belief that large treatment differences are not likely. For instance, 
we may initially believe that the mean difference δ0 will be 0. The prior should be 
spread to encompass a range of treatment differences considered plausible by the 
experts who designed the experiment. The probability of observing a mean difference 
equal or superior to the minimal clinically worthwhile benefit was set to 0.05 (the type I 
error α of the original trial). Assuming a value for σ, we can calculate n0 and specify the 
sceptical prior distribution p0 (δ). An enthusiastic prior would concordantly represent 
the beliefs of those “individuals who are reluctant to stop when results supporting the 
null hypothesis are observed”. They would expect the mean difference δ0 to be the 
minimal clinically worthwhile benefit. This second distribution would be spread with 
the same σ and n0 than the sceptical prior.  
 
Fig.1 (from [Spiegelhalter, Freedman and Parmar, 1994]) 
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In fig.1 we can see the sceptical (continuous line) and the enthusiast prior (intermittent 
line), with the probabilities of falling below, within and above the range of equivalence 
between treatments (dotted vertical lines) in the right hand corner32. 
With the data from the m patients gathered in the original trial, we can calculate the 
observed sample difference xm and the corresponding likelihood for LEV+5 versus 
control, as shown in fig.2. The probability that LEV+5-FU is an inferior treatment 




Fig.2 (from [Spiegelhalter, Freedman and Parmar, 1994]) 
Weighting the priors with the likelihood, we obtain their posterior distributions (fig.3) 
 
Fig.3 (from [Spiegelhalter, Freedman and Parmar, 1994]) 
                                                 
32 The range of equivalence is the space between the null hypothesis and the minimal clinically important 
difference, measured as an increase in average survival of a given number of months. 
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Should anyone holding the sceptical prior (continuous line) accept the efficacy of 
LEV+5-FU? Even if the posterior mean is now closer to the upper limit of the range of 
equivalence than the prior mean (fig.1), it is still within this range. The sceptic can 
reasonably refuse to accept the superiority of LEV+5-FU over the control treatment on 
the basis of the trial data. 
Despite this straightforward illustration, there is no such thing as a single Bayesian 
approach, not only to clinical trials, but generally. But for concreteness, let us just focus 
here on the general approaches to clinical trials classified by Spiegelhalter, Abrams and 
Miles in their textbook [2004, pp. 112-13].  
One classificatory criterion is the type of prior used in each approach. In the empirical 
Bayes approach, hyperparameters for the distribution of an array of studies assumed 
exchangeable can be estimated directly from these studies through a meta-analysis. In 
the proper Bayes approach the priors are constructed with either empirical data or 
subjective opinions (obtained through elicitation methods). Objective or reference prior 
distributions are used in the reference Bayes approach. These priors summarise a 
minimal amount of information: for instance, a uniform (e.g., flat) probability 
distribution over the range of interest; or the sceptical and enthusiastic priors of the 
previous example.  
We can also differentiate these approaches according to their methods of analysis and 
reporting. In the empirical Bayes approach, a frequentist meta-analysis of several 
studies is reinterpreted, under certain assumptions, as an approximation of a Bayesian 
estimate. In the reference Bayes and proper Bayes approaches, the analysis is a direct 
application of Bayes's theorem. However, in the former, depending on the priors, the 
posterior distribution would approximate the conclusions of a frequentist likelihood 
analysis.  Spiegelhalter, Abrams and Miles distinguish a fourth Bayesian approach to 
clinical trials: the full Bayes approach, in which decision theory is incorporated into the 
analysis so that judgments about treatments depend on the maximization of an expected 
utility function (with subjective probabilities).  
Hence, depending on the approach implemented, a Bayesian clinical trial will yield 
results that will diverge more or less from the conventional RCT. By way of example, 
we can compare the strength of a p-value for or against a given hypothesis with the 
corresponding Bayes factor. This latter is, in its simplest form, the ratio between the 
  31 
likelihoods of two alternative hypotheses, i.e., the probability of the data, assuming their 
truth: 
)|(/)|(BF 10 HdatapHdatap=  
The p-value is precisely the probability of observing a certain range of values (observed 
and unobserved), assuming the truth of a hypothesis. The BF is independent of the 
priors on the hypothesis33: it just compares how probable the observed data are 
assuming the truth of each hypothesis. If H0 states that there is no difference between 
treatments regarding a certain parameter (θ = 0) and H1 encompasses a range of 
alternative values of θ, the minimum Bayes Factor proposed by Steve Goodman takes, 
among these alternative values, the one that provides the “smallest amount of evidence 
that can be claimed for the null hypothesis (or the strongest evidence against it) on the 
basis of the data”. 
 
Of all possible θ ≠ 0 (H1), we take the one which makes higher the probability of 
obtaining the observed data, assuming the truth of H1 . For this value of θ, the BF will 
be minimum: a small BF implies that the observed data will be much more probable 
under H1 than under H0, just as a small p-value implies that there is a small probability 
of obtaining data as extreme or more than the one observed if H0 is true, which is why 
we should reject it.  
                                                 
33 Yet, it does depend on the prior distribution within hypothesis. The BF impinges on the prior 
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Table 1 (from [Goodman 1999b]) 
Table 1 provides a comparison between one particular minimum BF34 and the 
corresponding one-sided p-value (for a fixed sample size), for a range of values of the 
test statistic Z. For the conventional p-value threshold, 0.05, the BF is 0.15, meaning 
that the null hypothesis gets 15% as much support as the best supported alternative 
value of θ. As Goodman observes, this is a moderate strength of evidence against H0. If 
the prior probability of H0 is 0.75, the impact of the corresponding likelihood will yield 
a posterior of just 0.44. Only with a very low initial probability (0.26) will we obtain a 
posterior of 0.05.  
This illustration just shows that, for BF of a certain form, a Bayesian analysis can be as 
demanding as a conventional hypotheses testing or even more so. However, as 
Spiegelhalter, Abrams and Miles [2004, p. 132] point out, there is no simple monotonic 
relationship between Bayes factors and p-values. If we choose a different form for the 
BF, they can diverge from the p-values. In other words, the traditional frequentist 
approach to clinical trials and a possible Bayesian alternative will depend on a 
combination of principled and practical considerations that can justify this choice in 
case of discrepancy. Since this justification depends entirely on the type of Bayesian 
approach we choose, it is better to examine a couple of well-articulated examples to see 
how strong the Bayesian case can be. 
                                                 
34 Assuming a normal distribution and H1 ≠ 0, the minimum Bayes Factor would be: 
)2/exp(BF 2min mz−=  
where zm is the standardised test statistic for H0. For further details see [Goodman, 1999b]. 
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2.3 THE VERAMAPIL VS ITROPRUSSIDE TRIAL 
Our first example is a clinical trial aimed at determining the relative efficacy of two 
drugs, veramapil and nitroprusside, in controlling hypertension immediately after open-
heart surgery. The trial was conducted over 30 months, from September 1984 to March 
1987 in Baltimore, at Johns Hopkins Hospital, by a team led by E. Heitmiller and T. 
Blanck. The statistical advisors were led by J. Kadane at Carnegie Mellon University in 
Pittsburgh. Both drugs were already available, though verapamil was used for different 
heart conditions and counted as the experimental treatment in the comparison. A 
conventional RCT had already been attempted unsuccessfully at John Hopkins in the 
early 1980s, and in 1984 the idea arose of conducting instead a pilot Bayesian study. 
The trial implemented for the first time an approach developed by Kadane, N. Sedransk 
and T. Seidenfeld (hereafter KSS), in the early 1980s. Following the classification 
outlined above, the KSS approach, as implemented in the trial, would count as a proper 
Bayes approach: priors are elicited from a group of experts to be updated through Bayes 
theorem.  However, Kadane and his coauthors show a clear sympathy for the full Bayes 
approach: decision theory plays a certain role in the conceptual foundations of the KSS 
methodology (e.g.. [Sedransk, 1996]), even if in this particular trial utility functions 
were not elicited or postulated to account for any of the choices made.  
The main goal of the KSS approach is ethical: it is aimed at improving the allocation of 
treatments in a trial, so that patients receive a treatment that at least one expert would 
recommend in view of his personal characteristics. This way, they are protected against 
treatments that are unanimously considered inferior at the point they enter the trial. The 
elicited prior for the variable measuring the effect of each treatment probabilistically 
depends on a set of covariates (diagnostic indicators) and treatment. Depending on the 
values of these covariates in each patient, a computer will calculate which of the two 
treatments each expert would recommend for him, according to the expert’s updated 
prior.  
Whereas the implementation of the clinical equipoise principle in a frequentist RCT 
presupposes that the medical community has no statistical grounds to judge one 
treatment as superior until a significant conclusion is reached, in a Bayesian approach at 
least some actionable evidence can be attained earlier, depending on one’s prior and the 
data accumulated throughout the trial. The KSS approach uses this evidence in the 
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following manner: a patient will only receive a treatment if at least one expert judges it 
admissible, given his characteristics, at the point at which he enters the trial. From then 
on, the patient will never receive a treatment that the panel of experts in the trial agree 
to consider inferior at that point. 
Sedransk [1996] provides an excellent formal analysis of the notion of admissibility as 
implemented in the KSS design. It hinges on the following basic principles (for which 
Sedransk provides an axiomatic statement as well)35: 
P1: The outcome following treatment with any admissible treatment must be 
scientifically interpretable 
P2: Admissibility must be determined based on current information including 
data already gathered in the course of the clinical trial 
P3: A set of K experts is sufficient when the addition of any other expert (i.e., 
any other relevant scientific opinion) cannot change the admissibility or 
inadmissibility of any treatment. 
For a treatment to be admissible P1 requires that its effects can be traced to clearly 
defined factors (excluding therefore those “alternative” therapies without clear causal 
mechanisms to back up the experts’ opinion). P2 differentiates the KSS approach from 
standard RCTs since the evidence accumulated throughout the trial impinges on the 
definition of an admissible treatment. P3 is also crucial for the design of the study, since 
the trial will terminate only when the data gathered bring to an agreement the panel of 
experts whose priors are elicited for the study. The cogency of the results of the trial 
will therefore depend on the range of opinions represented in the panel. P3 establishes a 
sufficiency criterion to assess the diversity of this range.  
Several admissibility criteria can potentially satisfy this set of principles, of which the 
simplest one defines an admissible therapy “as a treatment considered superior or 
equivalent (to the proper comparison treatment(s)) by at least one expert in the panel”36. 
However, this criterion presents no particular difficulty for P1 and P2, but it will only 
comply with P3 if the views about each treatment in the scientific community are just a 
                                                 
35 Sedransk actually presents eight principles, but in order to simplify the discussion I will just consider 
three, those that she deems the “basic premises” for the KSS designs [Sedransk, 1996, p. 109] 
36 More formally, as Kadane puts it, “if at least one (updated) expert would consider it (in the computer) 
to have lower expected deviation from target than the other treatment” [Kadane, 1994, p. 223]. 
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few and are fully represented in the panel. Otherwise, the admissibility criterion may 
not secure that patients do not receive an inferior treatment. 
A variety of allocation rules based on admissibility criteria are possible within the KSS 
approach, sometimes departing from standard randomisation. The “statistical price” to 
pay for the ethical constraint imposed on allocation rules is that the likelihood function 
should explicitly condition on the patients’ characteristics that are considered in the 
allocation of a treatment. As Kadane and Seidenfeld [1996] show, the likelihood 
function would then be of the general form: 
∏∝ Jj jjjj X|TOfPf ),()( θθ  
Where Xj is the vector of relevant characteristics of jth patient, Tj is the treatment 
assigned to the jth patient and Oj the corresponding outcome. The past evidence up to 
and including the jth patient is expressed by Pj = (Oj, Tj, Xj, Oj-1, Tj-1, Xj-1,…, O1, T1, X1). 
θ is a vector of the parameters that determine the probability of an outcome Oj for a 
patient j given characteristics Xj and treatment Tj.  
This is the likelihood function that will be used in the allocation of treatments during the 
trial; conditioning on Xj, the set of diagnostic indicators used in the allocation of the 
treatment, makes explicit all the information on the outcome Oj carried by the assigned 
treatment. If the computer assigns treatments according to this information alone, all 
other sources of bias in the allocation will be excluded. Even if randomisation is 
acceptable in a Bayesian perspective in order to prevent selection biases, the KSS 
approach achieves this by virtue of its own design37. However, the allocation algorithm 
designed by Sedransk will make use of it in order to balance the independent variables. 
Let us now briefly review how the KSS methodology was implemented in the veramapil 
vs. nitroprusside trial conducted at Johns Hopkins Hospital38. Five experts representing 
a range of medical opinions about the treated condition were identified. Once the 
criteria of eligibility for the trial were set, the anaesthesiologist in charge of the study 
independently chose the four most important variables for predicting a prognosis for 
each of the participant patients. Then the prior opinion of each expert on the outcome 
                                                 
37 See [Kadane and Seidenfeld, 1990] for the details of this argument and a wonderful discussion of 
randomisation from a Bayesian perspective. 
38 This summary draws from the papers compiled in [Kadane, 1996, pp. 129-219]. 
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(the effects on arterial pressure) was elicited as a function of these covariates and the 
treatment administered39.  
The elicitation method designed by Kadane and his coauthors required an hour-long   
telephone interview. The prior was estimated assuming that the treatment outcome 
depended on the four predictor variables according to a normal linear model. There 
were 16 possible combinations of these variables and, therefore, 16 possible patient 
types. For each of these, each expert’s prior would allow us to estimate the effect of 
each treatment and therefore the expert’s preference for either veramapil or 
nitroprusside. 
Once the trial started, whenever a suitable patient was recruited, the values of  each of 
the four predictor variables were measured and entered into a computer, which yielded 
the mean arterial pressure predicted by each expert for a patient with such values 
according to each treatment. The computer also implemented an allocation rule as 
follows: if all the experts predicted a higher (better) mean arterial pressure with the 
same treatment, this one was assigned to the patient; otherwise, the computer would 
assign one at random with the constraint of maximising balance among treatments 
regarding the predicting variables. After a treatment was administered to a patient, the 
lowest mean arterial pressure recorded was also entered into the computer and the 
experts’ priors were updated. The updated priors were then used to deliver predictions 
for new patients entering the trial40. 
All in all, 29 patients completed the trial, 17 in the verapamil arm and 12 receiving 
nitroprusside. Even if the allocation rule made more likely that certain types of patients 
received one of the treatments more often, no statistically appreciable effect was 
detected. The results can be summarised in a table showing the treatment each expert 
would recommended for each type of patient before and after the treatment, using for 
                                                 
39 E.g.: “For patients on beta blockers and calcium antagonists who have no previous history of 
hypertension and no wall motion abnormality, what is your median for the average deviation of mean 
arterial pressure from 80mmHg?” [Kadane, 1996, p. 171]. The methodology of this elicitation procedure 
was exposed in full in [Kadane et al., 1980]. 
40 Due to a “gap in communication” between the medical team and the statistical advisors about how to 
measure the more beneficial outcome for patients, two different endpoints were used in the trial (each one 
with its own set of elicited priors): the lowest value of the mean arterial pressure and the average 
deviation from a target pressure, both over 30 minutes after the patient received the treatment (LADEV). 
An additional measure was used in the transition between these two. Also, due to a bug in the computed 
program, the treatments were not assigned according to the original allocation rule. However it was 
always a function of the patients’ characteristics alone and therefore the results were not biased by this 
change. For a discussion of these complications see Kadane’s section on “Operational History and 
Procedural Feasibility” [Kadane, 1996, pp. 171-176] 
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this end the priors elicited for LADEV, once updated with the data collected in the trial. 
This table shows “an overall trend towards preferring verapamil over nitroprusside” 
[Kadane and Sedransk, 1996, p. 177]. The prior and posterior distributions of each 
expert for the effects of each treatment in each type of patient are also presented. 
Kadane and Sedransk do not provide an aggregate of these opinions showing the degree 
of consensus attained and suggest instead a more general assessment, using standard 
indexes in cardiology to evaluate the effects of each treatment [Heitmiller et al., 1996]. 
Given the difficulties that hindered this particular implementation of the KSS approach, 
it is understandable that the trial yielded no strong conclusion. Actually, this study is not 
defended on the basis of the statistical strength of its results, but rather for its ethical 
superiority in terms of the standard of care provided to the participants. Let us then 
briefly examine this Bayesian methodology in the light of the ethical issues that arise in 
frequentist trials. It has already been mentioned that in the KSS framework it is possible 
to incorporate the actual beliefs of the medical community about a treatment: clinical 
equipoise can therefore be measured rather than merely postulated as in conventional 
RCTs. On the patients’ side, regarding their autonomy, it is open to discussion whether 
there is real understanding of the informed consent form regarding the allocation 
procedure. The participants in the verapamil trial had to deal with the following 
paragraph: 
The drug to be used in your case would be chosen with a recently developed 
statistical technique which incorporates the opinions of experts in the field 
concerning which drug is best for you, based on a variety of characteristics of 
the disease process, such as any history of high blood pressure or abnormal heart 
movements, rather than on an actual consideration of your case. If these opinions 
lead to the conclusion that only one of the drugs is allowable for you, that drug 
will be used. If both are found to be allowable, the assignment will be based on 
the need for balance in the characteristics of participants receiving each drug 
[Kadane, 1996, p. 141] 
Whether patients can understand this paragraph better than the usual sentence about 
flipping coins is a purely empirical question. A priori, it does not seem very plausible 
that they do. The autonomy of the participant in KSS trials seems to be grounded more 
on their desires than on their beliefs. If patients expect to benefit personally from their 
participation in a trial, it can be argued a priori that a KSS trial gives them a better 
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expected utility to do so under very reasonable assumptions [Emrich and Sedransk, 
1996]. Notice that this does not amount to straightforward choice of treatment by the 
patient [Kadane and Seidenfeld, 1996, pp. 118-119], but the KSS allocation rule 
probably does more to meet the demand for the personal recommendation of the 
physician than standard randomisation.  
This is also relevant to the justice of the allocation procedure. If the distribution of costs 
and benefits in a KSS trial admits a utilitarian justification from the patient’s point of 
view, a fortiori it will be equally justifiable from a contractarian perspective: if the 
treatment assigned is conditional on just the set of covariates capturing the relevant 
diagnostic indicators, no patient can claim that the allocation was intended to favour one 
person over another41. Hence, the KSS allocation rule admits a broader justification than 
randomisation, as far as the principle of justice is concerned. 
Lastly, the admissibility rule implemented in the verapamil trial provides a very strong 
implementation of the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence: patients will not 
receive a treatment that no expert recommends, and they have a better chance of 
receiving one they can personally benefit from than with randomisation. This is also 
relevant for the discussion of the trial-stopping rules, the other ethical contentious issue 
raised by frequentist trials. Let me quote Kadane again: 
Whether to stop is a different kind of decision in a design of this sort than it is in 
a classically randomised design. In the latter, there can be agonizing decisions 
about whether to suspend operations when it is fairly clear which treatment is 
best (either overall or for a subclass of patients), but the results are not yet 
“significant”. By contrast, in the trial suggested above, patients are protected 
from clearly bad treatments, so the decision of whether to continue has no 
ethical component. Rather, it is merely a question of whether the cost of 
continued data collection is repaid by the information gained. [Kadane, 1994, p. 
223] 
All in all, the KSS approach seems to comply better with the principles of autonomy, 
justice, and beneficence than do standard RCTs. However, its scope is somewhat more 
restricted: as Kadane [1994, p. 222] points out as well, the KSS approach will only offer 
protection to patients against inferior treatments if the results are gathered at a pace 
                                                 
41 Assuming, of course, that nobody can decide at what point a patient enters a trial: the later he does, the 
more accumulated information he will benefit from.   
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quick enough to update the experts’ priors before new patients enter the trial. In the 
verapamil trial the relevant data were ready for collection from each patient an hour 
after the surgical procedure. “In slower, more chronic diseases, there might be little or 
no information to capture at this step, and consequently little or no advantage to patients 
(or anyone else) in using these ideas” [Kadane, 1994, p. 222]. Not much was said about 
the advantages of the KSS approach from a regulatory perspective, but I will discuss 
this further in the final conclusion. 
 
2.4 THE ASTI TRIAL 
Our second example is ASTIN (Acute Stroke Therapy by Inhibition of Neutrophils), a 
phase II clinical trial conducted between 2000 and 2001 in order to test a 
neuroprotective therapy to stop or slow the death of brain cells in acute ischemic 
stroke42. Very few treatments are available for this condition, despite the tens of 
thousands of patients randomised into clinical trials over the last four decades. The 
ASTIN design was intended to provide a more efficient approach to clinical trials, 
improving the use of scarce patient resources and accelerating the development of 
promising therapeutic agents. ASTIN was described as follows:  
A Bayesian sequential design with real-time efficacy data capture and 
continuous reassessment of the dose response allowed double-blind, randomised, 
adaptive allocation to 1 of 15 doses (dose range, 10 to 120 mg) or placebo and 
early termination for efficacy or futility. The primary end point was change from 
baseline to day 90 on the Scandinavian Stroke Scale (SSS), adjusted for baseline 
SSS. [Krams et al., 2003, p. 2543] 
This is an instance of so-called adaptive designs: in trials of this sort, the design can be 
periodically modified depending on the evidence about certain hypotheses provided by 
the accumulated data. In ASTIN both treatment allocation and stopping rules were 
adaptive in a sense we will discuss in detail below. 
ASTIN was a multi-centre international trial, sponsored by a pharmaceutical company 
(Pfizer). The trial was designed by Donald Berry and Peter Mueller, from the University 
of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center. Under the leadership of Berry, over the last 
decade the centre became an international reference in the conduct of Bayesian clinical 
                                                 
42 The  neutrophil inhibitory factor UK-279,276. 
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trials43. Of the 964 trial protocols registered at M.D. Anderson between 2000 and early 
2005, 178 used both a Bayesian design and a Bayesian analysis, namely for monitoring 
efficacy and toxicity. Some trials implemented Bayesian adaptive randomisation and 
dose finding techniques and, to a lesser degree, hierarchical models and predictive 
probabilities were also incorporated. For the last thirty years, Berry has advocated a full 
Bayes approach to clinical trials, grounding his arguments both on statistical and ethical 
considerations. However, Berry and his team at M.D. Anderson work under a strict 
regulatory system which requires approval from various internal panels and, sometimes, 
the FDA and other national bodies. Due to these regulatory constraints, most of trials at 
M.D. Anderson were phase I/II or phase II, supported by extensive simulations of their 
operating characteristics showing their degree of equivalence with standard frequentist 
trials.  As Berry [2004, p. 186] puts it, 
At least for the near future they will be used as tools, with justifications 
following a more or less traditional frequentist course. As time passes and as 
researchers and regulatory folk become more accustomed to Bayesian ideas, 
they will be increasingly accepted on their own terms. 
The ASTIN trial is no exception in this respect, and its original design was described by 
their own authors as a “frequentist cake with Bayesian icing” [Berry et al., 2002, p. 
154]. This is why the efficiency of these constrained Bayesian designs is so prominently 
emphasised. Even if the “playing field” is not levelled, Bayesian trials can provide a 
more efficient solution to one of the main regulatory issues of our time: scientific 
innovation goes much faster than the development of new therapies and this delay is 
partly caused by the time constraints imposed by the current regulatory regime of RCTs.  
Bayesian phase II trials such as the one we will discuss here can be more efficient in the 
following ways [Krams et al., 2005, p. 1341]: the participant patients will be treated 
more effectively thanks to an adaptive allocation procedure that incorporates the 
available information about the more efficient dosage; their design allows a quicker and 
more reliable choice of the dose to be used later in the phase III trial; if the regulatory 
                                                 
43 See Berry’s profile in [Couzin, 2004]. For an overview of the trials conducted at M.D. Anderson, see 
[Biswas et al., 2009]. 
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authority permits, it is possible to make a seamless (and therefore quicker) transition 
from the dose finding to this confirmatory phase of the trial44.  
The aim of the ASTIN trial was to identify the minimum dose with satisfactory effects, 
defined as the ED95: this dose would deliver 95% of the maximum efficacy, minimizing 
unacceptable adverse reactions. ASTIN sought a point estimate of ED95 with minimal 
variance. In order to achieve this goal, a standard phase II design may use between three 
and five doses and placebo. Each dose will be tested on an equal number of patients, 
usually fixed, independently of their comparative efficacy that will only be revealed at 
the end of the trial. The patients’ reactions will provide the basis to estimate the dose-
response curve. However, part of the observations may be wasted depending on the 
adjustment between the true range of efficacy of the drug and the dosage tested in the 
trial. The separation between the doses tested will constrain the accuracy of the ED95 
estimate. Ideally, it would be better to test many different doses, but the number of 
patients that this would require to ground the power of a standard design is prohibitive. 
The ASTIN trial tested 15 doses and placebo. In order to learn quickly and make the 
sample size as small as possible an adaptive treatment allocation rule was implemented. 
The rule was grounded on a formal decision model that calculated, at each point in the 
trial, the expected utility of choosing a given dose with a view to minimise the expected 
variance of the response at the ED95. Once the optimal dose Zj was chosen, the next 
patient could receive either placebo (with a fixed probability p0) or a dose in the 
neighbourhood of Zj (the remaining probability 1- p0 was split uniformly over all of 
them)45.  
Another adaptive feature of the ASTIN trial was an optimal stopping rule. Once a week, 
in view of the available data, it had to be decided whether to end the trial abandoning 
the drug (futility), continue with the dose-finding phase or finish it switching to a phase 
III trial. A stopping rule grounded on another formal decision model was initially 
constructed, but the trial implemented a simpler approach, based on bounds of posterior 
probability, that the authors summarised as follows: 
                                                 
44 The original design of ASTIN [Berry et al., 2002] envisaged the possibility of this seamless transition 
between phase II and phase III, but it was not finally implemented. Inoue et al., 2002 provide another 
sequential design for a seamless phase II/III trial. 
45 This fixed lower bound p0 for placebo granted that there would be a group of patients (at least 15% of 
the total) providing a “comparison benchmark” in the study, as expected by the regulator: see [Walton, 
1995, p. 352]. 
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The stopping rule in ASTIN continuously asked the following questions: (1) 
Does our estimate of the dose–response suggest that there is <10% chance of 
success for any dose (success was defined as a >3-point recovery over and above 
placebo as measured by a stroke scale)? If so, then stop for futility. (2) For the 
best dose, is the response good enough to conclude that there is >90% chance of 
success? If so, then stop for efficacy and switch to a confirmatory trial, 
comparing the “best dose” against placebo. [Krams et al., 2005, p. 1343] 
The effects of this sort of therapy are measured around 90 days after the stroke, 
assessing the patient’s neurological deficit with a standardised scale. In order to update 
the dose allocation system before this three-month deadline, a predictive longitudinal 
model was built to estimate the score for eligible patients in the Scandinavian Stroke 
Scale (SSS). Once measured, the true day 90 score replaced the estimate. The model 
was built on the evidence gathered in the Copenhagen Stroke Database46 and was 
updated with the periodical responses obtained from patients in ASTIN . 
Finally, in ASTIN the probability model for the dose-response curve was a normal 
dynamic linear model47. In the initial week of the trial, the prior estimate was flat, with a 
placebo effect of 10 points change from the SSS baseline (calculated from the 
Copenhagen Database). Such prior would not influence much the final results of the 
analysis and therefore its validity was never a concern for the regulators, who could rely 
entirely upon the study data [Walton et al., 2005, p. 352]. Updating this model with the 
study data yielded posterior estimates and 95% posterior credible intervals of the dose-
response curve, ED95 and the effect over placebo at the ED95. 
The successful conduct of this trial depended on a computer system that recorded and 
processed the information entered by the investigators, ran the software implementing 
all the statistical models, delivered the dose for each patient to the investigators, and 
assessed the stopping rules, helping to monitor the progress of the study [Berry et al., 
2002, pp. 127-134]. In the actual trial, the computer system was run by a private 
company independently of the sponsor. 
The trial process could therefore be charted as follows48: 
                                                 
46 A compilation of data gathered over two years in a Copenhagen facility from 1351 pharmacologically 
untreated stroke patients.  
47 See [Berry et al., 2002] for details.  
48 I quote from [Krams et al., 2005, p. 1343].  
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[1] A patient enters the trial. Baseline data are entered into the system; 
[2] Patient is randomised in blinded fashion to placebo or “optimal” dose to 
learn about research question;  
[3] Dose assigned is converted to particular vial numbers, allowing for blinded 
administration of study drug;  
[4] Patient’s response data are entered into the system as they progress through 
the study;  
[5] Patient’s final outcome is predicted using a longitudinal model  (the 
prediction is substituted by the final response, as soon as it becomes available)  
[6] Based on the currently available data, the system updates the “estimate” of 
the dose response curve and its uncertainty;  
[7] Each day the algorithm implements a decision rule and recommends to 
either:  
[8] A0: stop the study because of futility (based on the posterior probability that 
the treatment has an effect smaller than a minimum clinically relevant size) or  
[9] A2: stop dose finding and moves to a large confirmatory study (based on the 
posterior probability that the treatment has an effect larger than some clinically 
relevant size);  
[10] A1: continue dose finding study (the recommendation of the system is 
reviewed by the IDMC, which incorporates clinical judgment and factors in 
safety issues);  
[11] The dose allocator chooses a dose from a list of possible doses that will 
optimise learning about the ED95 or some aspect of the dose-response curve. The 
database used to determine the dose is continually updated as outcome data from 
patients are gathered. 
Before the trial was started ASTIN was simulated under a wide range of assumptions in 
order to convince both the sponsors and the regulatory authorities of its soundness 
[Berry et al., 2002, pp. 135-154]. Simulations provided both optimal parameters for the 
algorithm and the operating characteristics of the design, allowing a comparison with a 
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standard RCT. The following table compares, for instance, the sample size required in 




For a dose-response curve that reached a plateau at 2, 3 or 4 points benefit over placebo, 
on the left side there is the number of patients needed for a 80% and 90% power. On the 
right side, for an adaptive design with a maximum of 1000 patients, you can see the 
percentage of trials that would stop for the same benefit over placebo and the median 
number of patients required in each. The trial was designed to detect a 3 point benefit 
over placebo49.  
In the actual trial, 966 patients were randomised, 26% of them to placebo. 40% of the 
patients were allocated to the top three doses. Quoting from the published results, “UK-
279,276 did not produce any statistically significant effect on any of the efficacy 
variables at any dose or dose category for any of the analysed populations” [Krams et 
al., 2003, p. 2545]. After 48 weeks, the Independent Data Monitoring Committee that 
oversaw the trial decided that it could be stopped for futility and no more patients were 
admitted. The algorithm allowed a conclusion of futility at week 40, so the number of 
patients recruited might have been smaller. However, the trial protocol required at least 
500 assessable patients before stopping. Those already in the trial were monitored for 
13 additional weeks without a positive-dose response. 
A less conservative protocol could have stopped the trial much earlier: apparently, 
similar conclusions could have been reached with half of the recruited patients [Walton 
et al., 2005, p. 356]. However, with sequential stopping rules, a frequentist design could 
have been effective with fewer patients than those estimated in table 2. As William du 
                                                 
49 For a more extensive comparative discussion of sample sizes in both approaches, see the contribution 
of Land and Wieand in [Berry et al., 2002, pp. 169-174] and the rejoinder in pp. 176-180.  
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Mouchel observed, the inflexibility of standard RCTs is more a consequence of the 
regulatory framework than of the frequentist approach itself [Walton et al., 2005, p. 
354]. The panel discussion of the ASTIN trial organized in 2005 in a FDA-sponsored 
symposium revealed a general appreciation of the simplicity of implementing, e.g., the 
stopping rule in a Bayesian approach. Yet it remains an open question to what extent it 
is necessary to become a fully committed Bayesian in order to benefit from the ASTIN 
techniques. I will return to this point in the final discussion.   
Finally, notice that, from an ethical perspective, the ASTIN trial is at least as defensible 
as a standard frequentist trial, and perhaps more so. Going again through the principles 
we examined in the KSS trial, the autonomy of the patient is certainly respected. When 
adaptive randomisation schemes are implemented in a M.D. Anderson trial, the 
informed consent form incorporates clauses along these lines:  
If you are ... eligible to take part in the study, you will be randomly assigned (as 
in the toss of a coin) to one of two treatment groups. Participants in one group 
will receive [regimen 1]. Participants in the other group will receive [regimen 2]. 
At first, there will be an equal chance of being assigned to either group. As the 
study goes along, however, the chance of being assigned to the treatment that 
worked better so far will increase. [Biswal et al., 2009, p. 214] 
Again, this seems no more difficult to understand than standard randomisation 
techniques in a conventional RCT, and plausibly  the patients will be happy that their 
chances of being assigned to the better treatment are gradually increased. Beneficence 
and non-maleficence are equally well observed. From the point of view of justice, the 
stopping rule originally designed for the trial is particularly interesting. This rule 
allowed maximisation of the value of each stroke patient entering the trial in order to 
optimise treatment for the overall population and the individual patients [Berry et al., 
2002, pp. 119-124]. From a utilitarian perspective, the sacrifices of the trial participants 
will be minimised and justified by the welfare the tested treatment would bring to this 
bigger collective [Krams et al., 2005, p. 1343]50. However, the contractarian argument 
to justify the distribution of costs and benefits among trial participants would also apply 
here.  
 
                                                 
50 From this perspective, it is really worth considering the procedure to calculate sample sizes developed 
in [Inoue et al., 2005]. 
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3. COCLUDIG DISCUSSIO: FREQUETIST VS BAYESIA TRIALS 
The examples discussed in the previous section show that, on the one hand, we have 
highly standardised frequentist RCTs, the design of which evolved under increasing 
regulatory pressure over the last 50 years. On the other hand, we have a plurality of 
Bayesian approaches to clinical trials: depending on which principles we want to 
implement, there is a wide range of designs available and more will certainly come in 
the future. What would a fair comparison under these circumstances be? Let us examine 
this question considering the three dimensions discussed in this paper: epistemological, 
ethical, and regulatory.  
Starting with the first one, we saw that p-values and confidence intervals are often 
misinterpreted in the medical literature as if they provided direct probabilities for 
particular events in clinical trials (§1.1). If this is not just a misunderstanding, but rather 
the expression of the sort of probability assignment the medical profession is interested 
in, this is an argument for the Bayesian approach, in which these probabilities can be 
correctly calculated. The objections against randomisation we examined in section 1.2 
do not apply, in principle, to its use in Bayesian trials, since it does not provide any 
inferential grounds: randomisation can be defended in a Bayesian perspective as a 
device against allocation biases [Berry and Kadane, 1997]. Even in this respect, there 
are alternatives to randomisation in a Bayesian approach, like conditioning on the 
allocation mechanism (and implementing it in a computer in order to assign treatments): 
the KSS approach provided a nice illustration of this possibility. We saw in section 1.4 
that RCTs were mainly adopted in Britain and the United States for the warrant they 
provided against biases. Bayesian trials can provide such warrants, using randomisation 
if necessary.  
Hence, in principle, Bayesianism is a suitable alternative for the potential epistemic 
demands of the medical profession. From a pure research perspective, any kind of 
Bayesian trial provides an excellent tool to conduct experiments to learn about 
therapies, and in non-regulatory contexts their use is growing fast [Biswas et al., 2009]. 
The thorny question is what kind of Bayesian approach should be preferred for the 
design and analysis of clinical trials in a regulatory context, where experiments should 
prove the efficacy and safety of a compound. It is at present dubious whether there is a 
purely epistemic response to this issue. 
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As I briefly mentioned in the discussion of the ASTIN trial, from a purely pragmatic 
perspective it may seem possible to use the more suitable technique for the goals of 
each trial, be it frequentist or Bayesian, without paying much attention to coherence 
(e.g. [Walton et al., 2005, p. 354]). However, the main epistemic argument for 
Bayesianism is that it makes it possible to carry out the entire design and analysis of a 
trial within a coherent framework (e.g., [Walton et al., 2005, p. 356]). In this respect, the 
apex of coherence would be provided by a full Bayes approach, in which every decision 
to be made in a trial could be explicitly formalised. This may not be very attractive for 
many practitioners: as it was observed in the discussion of the ASTIN design, the utility 
functions that feature in decision models are often simplistic in order to facilitate 
computations [Berry et al., 2002, p. 167].  Yet, as Berry often notes, the decisions will 
be made anyway and the formalisation contributes to clarify our choices and make them 
more transparent to every stakeholder in the trial. The verapamil and the ASTIN trials 
are both supported by expected utility calculations that are certainly relevant from the 
patient’s perspective. 
The open question here is whether it is possible to incorporate in a unified decision 
model all the interests at stake. John Whitehead [1993, p. 1410] presented this problem 
as follows. Three different goals are usually pursued in phase III clinical trials: 
regulatory agencies (acting on behalf of patients and consumers) want to keep out of the 
market ineffective and harmful compounds; pharmaceutical companies want to 
introduce into the market effective and safe compounds; finally, clinicians are interested 
in acquiring information on the relative characteristics of the experimental and control 
treatments. This is certainly a simplification, since all parties are interested in all aspects 
of the trial, but, it shows nonetheless that there is no single decision maker in clinical 
trials. But from a Bayesian perspective, this multiplicity of agents is difficult to 
encompass in a unified model51. There may be limits to the implementation of a full 
Bayes approach in a regulatory context.  
As Whitehead points out, in standard RCTs all these interests are somehow represented 
in the different elements of the analysis: small p-values express the concerns of the 
regulator; high-powered trials give a better chance of showing the efficacy of a 
compound and thus are in the producer's interest; and the estimates of the comparative 
                                                 
51 This is too technical an issue to discuss here, but it is certainly not neglected by the authors we are 
considering here: see, for instance, the compilation of essays in [Kadane, Schervish and Seidenfeld, 
1999].  
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difference between treatments will serve the clinician's interests. Of course, as we saw, 
it is easy to approximate all these aspects of standard RCTs from a Bayesian 
perspective, even without a full-fledged decision model. But, again, there are too many 
ways of approximating these characteristics in a Bayesian trial. In the current 
epistemology of science, this is more a virtue than an obstacle: as the methodological 
debate on evidence-based medicine illustrates (e.g., [Worrall, 2007]), scientific data 
serve different practical purposes and it is good to have different approaches to assess 
them (e.g., [Cartwright, 2006]). However, in a regulatory context, this plurality of 
standards may complicate the final decision: whether to authorise or not the commercial 
distribution of a drug. As Robert Temple, an FDA officer put it in an informal debate on 
the incorporation of Bayesian approaches to regulatory decisions: 
Of course, everybody knows that "p < 0.05" is sort of stupid. Why should it 
always be the same? Why shouldn't it be adjusted to the situation, to the risks of 
being wrong in each direction? The alternative to adopting a standard is to 
actually determine a criterion for success on the spot for each new case. That is 
my idea of a nightmare. So, we use a foolish, if you like, simplification. Maybe 
we adjust it sometimes when we feel we have to but you simplify the process a 
little bit so you can get done. I don't want to have to have a symposium for every 
new trial to decide on an acceptable level of evidence. [Berry et al., 2005, p. 
303] 
The FDA has been revising their views on acceptable evidence for regulatory purposes 
over the last decade. Two landmarks in this process are the so-called Evidence 
Document and the Critical Path Initiative report52: both texts acknowledge that quicker 
phase III trials drawing on broader data sources are necessary in order to accelerate the 
approval of new drugs. The current regulatory process is costly for pharmaceutical 
companies and deprives patients of access to potentially life-saving drugs for years. 
Complaints about this drug lag date back to the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the 
FDA enforced the current regulatory regime requiring two trials. However, nowadays 
the Bayesian approach provides a viable alternative to RCTs in order to meet this 
demand for faster trials and it has been defended precisely along these lines: patients 
                                                 
52 Food and Drug Administration, Innovation or stagnation? Challenge and opportunity on the critical 
path to new medical products (2004) and Providing clinical evidence of effectiveness for human drug and 
biological products. Guidance for industry (1998), both available at http://www.fda.gov (accessed in July 
2009). 
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want quick access to a better standard of care from the early testing stages just as much 
as the industry wants faster trials.   
In my view, an argument about the way Bayesian trials can help to protect the consumer 
from incorrect regulatory decisions is still lacking. In particular, it is still undecided 
which is the best design to cope, within a Bayesian framework, with the growing 
financial pressure exerted by pharmaceutical companies in the conduct of for-profit 
clinical trials. The KSS admissibility criteria illustrate the sort of practical issues 
involved in this process. If an expert decides to recommend a treatment independently 
of the accruing data, patients will not be protected from inferior treatments; thus it is 
necessary to incorporate a (fourth) admissibility principle in order to prevent such 
situations53. Mutatis mutandis, a similar principle should be applied to the selection of 
priors in a trial conducted for regulatory purposes, so that pharmaceutical companies do 
not make abusive use of exaggeratedly optimistic priors. That is, this should occur 
unless, as happened in the ASTIN trial, we use priors with minimal information in order 
not to influence the trial data, thus diminishing the potential to exploit the information 
available before the trial. 
I think Steven Goodman is right in pointing out the necessity of a middle ground 
between the potential flexibility of Bayesian approaches and the necessity of 
standardised Bayesian procedures that secure good (and quick) regulatory decisions 
[Berry, 2005, p. 304]. Once these procedures are agreed, their ethical superiority to 
standard RCTs may not be as outstanding as it currently appears in the examples 
discussed in the previous section, but this should not be the crucial consideration in our 
choice of a design for regulatory purposes. Even if it is an imperative to conduct clinical 
trials with the highest ethical standards, in the current regulatory regime most of them 
are conducted for the sake of consumer protection. In my view, this latter goal should 
prevail, as long as our societies deem it necessary to have regulatory agencies 




                                                 
53 The principle goes as follows: “At the outset, no experimental treatment is guaranteed perpetual or even 
very long-term admissibility” [Sedransk ,1996, p. 77]. 
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